Dueling with Dualism

Of the Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, the one I’ve been most interested in has been the Samkhya System of the sage Kapila, in part because it is generally seen as non-theistic (essentially, it argues that God is neither necessary for creation nor provable, so positing Ishvara is unnecessary and fruitless) and in part because of its philosophical connection to yoga, so much so that sometimes the Six Systems are reduced to three, Samkya and Yoga being combined.

Its emphasis on rational inquiry also resonates with me; the Western scholar of Samkhya, Richard Garbe, said, “In Kapila’s doctrine, for the first time in the history of the world, the complete independence and freedom of the human mind, its full confidence in its own powers, was exhibited.” And while I’m not sure that’s completely true (in spite of subjecting them to rational analysis, Samkhya does still treat the Vedas as incorrigible), you gotta appreciate the way the school consistently uses argument to make the case for its claims.

Among the most interesting of these (to me), is the way in which Samkhya sets out to support its dualist ontology, a metaphysical position that, as a kind of knee-jerk physicalist, I have long been skeptical of. Samkhya posits two ultimate realities, Purusha, which we might think of as pure consciousness, and Prakriti, which, in a probably oversimplified way, is all of Nature, the entire universe if you will.

It’s sort of like the dualist distinction we get in the West (most famously, perhaps, in Descartes) between mind and matter, or spirit and body, but much broader, I’d say. Descartes was mainly interested in distinguishing our self from our body; Samkhya’s dualism is more about the difference between all matter and all consciousness, although again, that’s probably an oversimplification.

Anyway, what’s cool is that Samkhya doesn’t just stipulate purusha; it argues for its existence. (To be fair, Descartes didn’t just stipulate mind either; although his proof for it, which depends upon mind and body having different qualities is arguably circular.)

Swami Prabhavananda lists five proofs; the ones that are most intriguing to me are number three: “…since prakriti is nonintelligent, there must be something or someone to experience its operation;” and four: “…there must be a supreme background, a centre, to co-ordinate all experience, for our experiences are multiple, and we may have multiple experiences simultaneously.”

Combing these two, I understand that therefore, purusha is necessarily implied by the existence of prakriti; consciousness, if you will, has to exist because matter exists.

Hmmm…

I guess you could simply deny proof three, and proof four seems kind of Thomas Aquinas’ version of the teleological argument and so would be subject to the same sorts of concerns, but still, it’s an ingenious and compelling set of arguments on the part of the Samkhya System.

And also, I wonder if, to illustrate it, on a much smaller scale, the fact that my body is sitting here, wrangling with these claims, necessarily implies that I have a consciousness which does so.

Hmmm…